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TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY
VOL 32 NO. 2 WINTER 1959
POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY -
A COMPARATIVE STUDY*
W. J. WAGNERt
The requirement of jurisdictional amount is a limitation on the
jurisdiction of federal courts, imposed upon them by the legislature.
The courts themselves refuse to take cognizance of some disputes, with-
out being bound to do so by any express provision of law, by classifying
them as non-justiciable or political ones.
The problem of political questions has its place not only in federal
legal systems. It arises in unitary states and in the life of members of
a federal state as well.' However, its scope in federal systems is broader.
Political questions may be found to exist in disputes as to the right of
intervention of the federation into the internal affairs of the member
states; as to the conformance by a member state with the federal con-
stitutional requirement of a republican form of government; as to
coercion of the member states to observe the federal laws, etc. All such
problems have no place in a unitary state.
United States
In the United States, the existence of non-justiciable questions,
which should be definitely answered by the executive or the legislative
* This article is based on a forthcoming book, Federal States and Their Judiciary
-A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law and Organization of Courts in Federal
States, Mouton & Co., Publishers, The Hague, Holland.
t Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Thus, e.g., in Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N.E. 889 (1934), the Supreme
Court of Illinois gave full effect to Art. 4, Sec. 9 of the state Constitution, providing
that "(e)ach house shall determine the rules of its proceedings, and be the judge
of the election, returns, and qualifications of its members," and held that a member
of the House of Representatives who regularly received a certificate of election, was
seated in the legislature, and cast his vote for a statute passed by the House, must be
treated by the courts as entitled to do so. The rule stands even if the decision of the
House on the qualification of its members was arbitrary or wrong, as the whole matter
is beyond further controversy in the courts.
Similarly, in State ex. rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio 510, 9 N.E.2d 278 (1937),
it was held that a determination of the General Assembly of the State that emergency
existed requiring the enactment of a special law to go into immediate effect upon its
passage, was not reviewable by the courts.
For many other examples, see W. F. Dodd, Judicially Non-Entforcible Provisiows
of Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L Rtv. 54 (1931).
(135)
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branch of government, was early recognized.2 In Marbury v. Madi-
son,' Chief Justice Marshall said:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, sub-
mitted to the executive, can never be made in the court.4
Thus, the Chief Justice classified the political questions into two
categories: first, those which are submitted to the executive (or, we may
add, to the legislature) by some specific provision of law, and lie within
their discretion; and second, those which are political by nature.
The existence of the first category is rather obvious. In spite of
the fact that no provision of law withdrew from the courts authority
to pass on certain types of questions, it is only fair, on the part of the
courts, to abstain from considering such questions if it may be reason-
ably inferred that the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, or
drafters of the law, was that the decision of one of the two "political"
branches of the government be final.
Thus, Art. I, Sec. 5, clause 1 of the Constitution provides that
"each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifica-
tions of its own members . . .". Considering this provision, it is not
surprising that in Colegrove v. Green,' the Supreme Court refused to
invalidate the electoral districting of the State of Illinois.' However,
three Justices dissented on the ground that the Illinois law, by virtue
2. The idea that courts cannot take cognizance of all claims came to the United
States with the system of English law; M. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37
HARv. L. REv. 338 (1924). As early as 1460, a judicial determination of the Duke's
of York rights to the throne was refused, but the peculiar circumstances of this case
make it hardly a precedent for later "political questions" cases; M. F. Weston,
Political Questions, 38 H~Av. L. REv. 296, 302-305 (1925).
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 414.
4. Id. at 170.
5. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
6. At this point it is interesting to note that in England, the House of Commons
was anxious to have exclusive jurisdiction on electoral disputes. In 1704, it resolved
that "neither the Qualification of any Elector, or the Right of any Person elected,
is cognizable or determinable elsewhere than before the Commons of England, in
Parliament assembled," and that persons submitting electoral disputes to the deter-
mination of any other body, are guilty of a "Breach of the Privilege of this House;"
W. C. COSTIN AND J. S. WATSON, 1 Ta LAW AND WORKING OF THE CONSTITUTION:
DocUMENTS 1660-1914, at 193 (1952). The resolution was branded by the House
of Lords as "destructive of the Property of the Subject, against the Freedom of
Elections," and as ending "to encourage Corruption and Partiality in Officers who
are to make Returns to Parliament, and to subject the Freeholders and other Electors
to their arbitrary Will and Pleasure;" (supra, at 194). The House of Lords resolved
that "the detterring Electors from prosecuting Actions in the ordinary Course of Law
. . . is a manifest assuming a Power to control the Law, to hinder the Course of
Justice, and subject the Property of Englishmen to the arbitrary Votes of the House
of Commons (supra, at 195).
[Vol. 32
1959] POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 137
of which the population in electoral districts ranged from 112.000 to
900.000, abridged the constitutional rights of citizens to be fairly repre-
sented in Congress. And in a previous case of Smiley v. Holm 7 the
Court assumed jurisdiction of a case presenting similar problems. A
recent case followed Colegrove v. Green.'
A similar result was reached by an extensive interpretation of the
constitutional provision authorizing Congress "to pay the debts" of
the United States.. In 1890, Congress enacted a statute by virtue of
which producers of sugar were entitled to some "bounties" paid out of
the Treasury of the United States. By virtue of the Tucker Act, some
producers brought a suit against the United States to get their "boun-
ties." The Court interpreted the term "debts" as covering "payments
that are not of right or of any legal claim, but which are in the nature
of a gratuity depending upon equitable considerations," " and held:
Their recognition depends solely upon Congress, and whether
it will recognize claims thus founded must be left to the discretion
of that body . . . " (G)enerally such question must in its
nature be one for Congress to decide by itself. Its decision recog-
nizing such a claim and appropriating money for its payment can
rarely, if ever, be the subject of review by the judicial branch of
the government.'
The decision of the political branches of government is final if they
act within the scope of their discretion, validly conferred upon them.
Thus, in the early case of Martin v. Mott,'8 Justice Story dis-
cussed the constitutional power of Congress "to provide for calling
forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrec-
tions, and repel invasions," 14 and a congressional act of 1795 authoriz-
ing the President to "call forth" the militia when and where he may
judge it necessary. Story reached the conclusion "that the authority
to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the
president, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons." '5
This authority was strictly connected with the problem of common
defense and internal security of the Union, and military discipline re-
quired that it be not contested by those to which orders were issued.
7. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
8. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
9. Art. I, Sec. 8(1).
10. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 442 (1895).
11. Id. at 441.
12. Id. at 444.
13. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
14. Art. I, Se. 8(15).
15. Martin v. Mott, supra note 13, at 30.
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"If a superior officer has a right to contest the orders of the president,
upon his own doubts as to the exigency having arisen," said Story, "it
must be equally the right of every inferior officer and soldier." 16 He
emphasized the constitutional provision making the President the
"commander in chief . . . of the militia . . . when called into the
actual service of the United States," "7 and continued:
The law does not provide for any appeal from the judgment
of the president, or for any right in subordinate officers to review
his decision, and in effect defeat it. Whenever a statute gives a
discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him, upon
his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction,
that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts.'
The discretionary power of the President is particularly broad
when he acts in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief, and takes steps
necessary to protect the Union. In the Prize Cases,'9 the Court said:
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-
in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed
hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions
as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents,
is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed
by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Govern-
ment to which this power was entrusted. "He must determine
what degree of force the crisis demands." The proclamation of
blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that
a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse
to such a measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case.
(Emphasis by the Court.)
A legislative reflection of the doctrine that courts do not pass upon
the discretionary governmental acts is found in a provision of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, excluding from the consent of the government
to be sued claims based upon the exercise of "a discretionary function"
of a federal employee or agency.2" The broad interpretation of the con-
cept of "discretionary" given by the Supreme Court in Dalehite v.
United States,2' was somewhat narrowed in most recent decisions.'
16. Ibid.
17. Art. II, Sec. 2(1).
18. Martin v. Mott, supra note 13, at 31-32.
19. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
20. 28 U.S.C.A. §2680(a).
21. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
22. Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-A Liberalized Interpretation, 35 NFB. L. REv.
509 (1956).
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The question is more difficult when there is no legal provision
submitting some types of disputes to the jurisdiction of the political
branches of the government. Even then the courts may find that the
matter lies within the discretion of a political branch, which precludes
them from considering the merits of the dispute. In many cases, the
courts find it difficult to classify a question as a justiciable or political
one. Very often opinions are delivered by a divided court. Thus, in
Coleman v. Miller,3 the question presented was whether the lieutenant
governor of Kansas was a part of the legislative body of that State or
not. The Supreme Court was equally split on the decision as to the
justiciability of the problem.
The field in which the courts were always reluctant to interfere
with the decisions of the political branches of government was the
conduct of the international relations of the Union. Art. II, Sec. 2(2)
and Sec. 3 of the Constitution vested in the President the duty of
making treaties, appointing ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and receiving representatives of foreign powers. The Senate
(or Congress) has an auxiliary role to that of the President. Actions
taken by either of them, in connection with the foreign affairs of the
Union, are usually recognized by the courts as final.24 As early as
1796, Paterson, Justice of the Supreme Court, said in Ware v. Hylton
that in those matters, there are "considerations of policy, considerations
of extreme magnitude, and certainly entirely incompetent to the ex-
amination and decision of a court of justice." 2
One and a half century later, the case of Chicago & Southern
Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.' gave the Court an occasion
for similar broad statements. The case involved the power of the
courts to review orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board on applications
of United States citizens for permission to engage in international air
transportation. As such orders are subject to approval by the Presi-
dent, the Court held them not to be reviewable by the courts. In a
five-to-four decision, the Court emphasized the fact that the Chief
Executive, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States armed forces,
23. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
24. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936),
the Court, speaking about international affairs, said: "In this vast external
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes
the treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into
the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless
to invade it" (emphasis by the Court). In fact, in order to be sure that a treaty will
be consented to by the Senate, the President invites, from time to time, some Senators
to follow negotiations.
25. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 260 (1796).
26. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948).
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and "The Nation's organ for foreign affairs," must often rely, in his
decisions, on secret reports which cannot be made public and discussed.
The Court continued:
. . . (T)he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign
policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided
by our Constitution to the political departments of the government,
Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and in-
volve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be under-
taken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare
they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which
the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power
not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry."
The dissent of the minority was based on the fact that Congress
provided for judicial review of orders of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and the situation under consideration should not be held to
be an exception.
Among the most important matters which are thus entirely left to
the determination of the executive or legislative branch, are:
(1) Recognition of new states or governments. In Gelston v.
Hoyt,2" the Supreme Court stated that there was no better established
doctrine "than that it belongs exclusively to governments to recognise
new states, in the revolutions which may occur in the world; and until
such recognition, either by our own government, or the government to
which the new state belonged, courts of justice are bound to consider
the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered." " In subsequent
cases in point, starting with United States v. Palmer, the Court
eliminated from its consideration the decision of the foreign government
involved, and made it clear that it will consider itself bound by the
attitude taken by the United States government.
If a new government is recognized by the United States, its actions
will be given effect by the courts. In the well known cases of United
States v. Belmont 8" and United States v. Pink, 2 the Court went as far
27. Id. at 111.
28. Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 324 (1818).
29. See the interesting case of Kenneth v. Chambers, 48 U.S. (14 How.) 38(1852), in which the Court decided to consider Texas as a part of Mexico after it
proclaimed its independence, in absence of a declaration of the United States govern-
ment that it recognized the new state of things. The fact that subsequent to the
factual situation which gave rise to the controversy, the independence of Texas was
recognized, and then the new State was admitted to the Union, was held not to have
any retroactive effect.
30. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 643-635 (1818).
31. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
32. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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as to attach extra-territorial effect to Soviet Russia's expropriation
decrees, after its government was recognized." On the other hand,
actions taken by a non-recognized government will be ignored."4
(2) Position taken by the United States government in its dis-
putes with a foreign nation particularly as to national sovereignty
over some territories. Said the Court:
The judiciary is not that department of the government, to
which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is con-
fided; and its duty commonly is, to decide upon individual rights,
according to those principles which the political departments of
the nation have established. . . . We think . . . it is the
province of the court to conform its decisions to the will of the
legislature, if that will has been clearly expressed."5
And the Court held grants made by Spain on territories which
were considered by the government of the United States as belonging
to the Union, void.
Similarly, the Court will consider itself to be bound by the deter-
mination of the United States government as to the sovereignty on
territories not claimed by the Union. In Williams v. The Suffolk
Insurance Co.," the Court followed the position taken by the govern-
ment in denying that the government of Buenos Aires had sovereignty
over the Falkland Islands, and that it had authority to regulate or
prohibit fisheries at those islands to United States citizens.
Assertion of national sovereignty on land or water by the political
branches of government is a political act and "conclusively binds the
judges" 17 even if it does not give rise to any controversy on the inter-
national scene. Thus, a determination of the President that a guano
island shall be considered as appertaining to the United States gave
33. In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), the Supreme Court
upheld the effectiveness of seizure of some hides in Mexico, owned by a Mexican
citizen; the seizure was ordered by the revolutionary Mexican government of General
Carranza, which was subsequently recognized by the United States. The Court
asserted that "such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions
and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence"(at 303), and that "what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision" (at 302).
34. The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944); Latvian State S.S. Line v. Mc-
Grath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 816 (1951).
35. Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829). The case
involved the interpretation of the treaty of St. Ildefonso of 1800, by which Louisiana
was ceded by Spain to France, and which was ambiguous as to the boundaries of the
ceded territory. In 1803, the United States purchased the territory from France.
For another case arising out of the same situation and applying the Foster rule, see
Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838).
36. Williams v. The Suffolk Insurance Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
37. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
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jurisdiction to the federal courts to try offenders for crimes committed
on the island. 8
Recently, the doctrine was extended. In United States v. Cali-
fornia,9 the Court held that the "assertion of national dominion over
the three-mile belt is binding upon this Court," and recognized the
federal government's rights in the resources of the soil under that
water area, including oil, against the claims of the State of California.
Later, by a Congressional act, claims of the States to the sub-soil in the
coastal area were recognized.'
(3) Existence or termination of international treaties. In the
early case of Ware v. Hylton,41 Justice Paterson attributed to Congress
alone the power to void a treaty if the other party to it violates it.
Should Congress make such a declaration, said the Justice, "I shall deem
it my duty to regard the treaty as void, and then to forbear any share
in executing it as a judge." Otherwise, the treaty must be regarded as
"valid and obligatory." Therefore, in Doe v. Braden,4" the Court
treated the treaty with Spain of 1819, by which Florida was ceded to
the United States, valid in its entirety, as against the contention that
its provisions annulling some grants of land made by the King of Spain
was invalid as the King could not validly consent to them.
Again, in Clark v. Allen," as against the contention that a treaty
with Germany was invalidated by the First World War, as Germany
"has ceased to exist as an independent national or international com-
munity," the Court said:
But the question whether a state is in a position to perform
its treaty obligations is essentially a political question . . . We
find no evidence that the political departments have considered
the collapse and surrender of Germany as putting an end to such
provisions of the treaty as survived the outbreak of the war or the
obligation of either party in respect to them. 4
Conversely, if Congress passes a law inconsistent with an existing
international obligation, the courts will apply the law and treat the
obligation as terminated. Among many cases in point, the "Chinese
38. Ibid.
39. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 34 (1947). In a later suit, the rights
of the United States were recognized as against Texas; 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
40. The Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953). The motions of the States
of Alabama and Rhode Island for leave to file complaints challenging the constitution-
ality of the Act were denied by the Supreme Court; Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272
(1954), two Justices dissenting. In a per curiam opinion, the Court relied on Art. 4,
Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution, vesting in Congress unlimited power "to dispose of any
kind of property belonging to the United States."
41. Ware v. Hylton, supra note 25, at 261.
42. Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
43. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
44. Id. at 514.
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Exclusion Case," Chae Chan Ping v. United States,5 is well known.
The Court held that the power of Congress to exclude aliens from the
Union was an incident of sovereignty which could not be surrendered
by a treaty. Thus, a statute excluding Chinese laborers, being con-
stitutional, prevailed over existing treaties with China. Undoubtedly,
this decision and judgments in other cases to the same effect are
unable to extinguish any international obligations of the United States.
But this is not a problem with which the courts of the nation are
concerned.
(4) Some emergency measures caused by war. Thus, in Com-
mercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller,6 the Court refused to review
an order of the Alien Property Custodian, directing a trust company
to transfer to him money and property held by the company on the
joint account of an enemy alien and a neutral alien. The Custodian
acted under power granted the President by Congress. The Company
challenged the determination of the Custodian as to such an account,
and contended that anyhow his power should terminate with the
Congressional resolution declaring the state of war at an end, and the
Proclamation of Peace by the President. The Court held for the
Custodian, stressing his broad powers, and emphasizing the finality
of the determination of the political branches of government as to the
duration of emergency measures. Said the Court:
• . (T)he power which declared the necessity is the power to
declare its cessation, and what the cessation requires. The power
is legislative. A court cannot estimate the effects of a great war
and pronounce their termination at a particular moment of time,
and that its consequences are so far swallowed up that legislation
addressed to its emergency had ceased to have purpose or operation
with the cessation of the conflicts in the field.47
A similar result was reached in Ludecke v. Watkins,48 where de-
cisions of the President as to the termination of the state of war and
as to the exclusion of alien enemies from the United States were held
to be "matters of political judgment for which judges have neither
technical competence nor official responsibility." Recognition of broad
discretion of the political branches of government as to measures neces-
sitated by war towards the citizens of the United States is illustrated
by Hirabayashi v. United States4 9 and Korematsu v. United States."°
45. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
46. Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923).
47. Id. at 57.
48. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
49. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
50. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY
(5) Granting of diplomatic immunity. The determination of the
President, or more often of the Secretary of State, as to the status of
persons claiming such an immunity is recognized by the courts as bind-
ing upon them. In an early case, United States v. Ortega,5' a United
States circuit court said:
The Constitution of the United States having vested in the
president the power to receive ambassadors and other public
ministers, has . . . bestowed upon that branch of the govern-
ment, not only the right, but the exclusive right, to judge of the
credentials of the ministers so received; and so long as they con-
tinue to be recognized and treated by the president as ministers,
the other branches of the government are bound to consider them
as such.
Of course, the courts will not treat as a diplomat a person repre-
senting a state or government which is not recognized by the govern-
ment of the United States. 2 In other cases, the person claiming
immunity should, in order to prevail, secure a statement of the Depart-
ment of State that he should be recognized as a diplomat.' It may be
in a form of certificate, 4 letter," affidavit or telegram.56 Should he
be unable or neglect to procure such a statement, he runs the risk that
diplomatic status will be denied to him."
The determination of the Department of State is conclusive not
only with respect to persons claiming to be accredited in the United
States (or to be members of their staff or household), but also with
respect to those connected with an international organization. In
recent years, the number of cases involving such persons has largely
increased due to the establishment of the headquarters of the United
Nations in New York.5
51. United States v. Ortega, 27 Fed. Cas. 359, 361 (No. 15,971) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1825).
52. United States v. Skinner, 27 Fed. Cas. 1123 (No. 16,309) (C.C.D.N.Y.
1818).
53. W. J. Wagner, The Original and Exclusive Jurisdictions of the United States
Supreme Court, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 111, 127 ff. (1952).
54. United States v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084 (No. 14,568) (C.C. Pa. 1830).
55. Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496 (D.C. 1949).
56. In re Anfrye, 3 Wkly. Notes Cas. 188 (Pa. 1876).
57. Hollander v. Baiz, 41 Fed. 732 (D.C.N.Y. 1890) ; Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A.2d
226 (D.C. Mun. App. 1945).
58. In general, the State Department recognizes the diplomatic character of foreign
representatives in the United Nations and of the members of their staff; Friedberg v.
Santa Cruz, 86 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1949). As to the staff of the United Nations Secre-
tariat, immunity is granted to high officials; Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d
206 (1947). It is denied to employees on lower level; United States v. Coplon, 84
F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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Somewhat connected with the field of foreign affairs of the
country are relations with the Indian tribes. In the famous case of
the Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia,"9 the Supreme Court denied
relief to the tribe against a clear violation, by the State of Georgia, of
a treaty between the Indians and the United States. Marshall, speaking
for the Court, intimated that the controversy presented political rather
than legal questions. Clearly, in declining to take jurisdiction of the
controversy, the Court was influenced by the certainty that Georgia
would completely disregard an adverse decision.
As to questions classified by Marshall as "in their nature political,"
much doubt may arise. Here, no provision of law may support the
refusal of the courts to take jurisdiction of the dispute.
Attempts by the Supreme Court to establish some tests for deter-
mining what questions are "in their nature political" failed. They are
vague and do not offer any help when a concrete case is faced. Thus,
in Coleman v. Miller,' Chief Justice Hughes said:
In determining whether a question falls within [the political]
category, the appropriateness under our system of government of
attributing finality to the action of the political departments and
also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination
are dominant considerations.
Obviously, this "test" does not help at all in any concrete situation.
Neither does Justice Frankfurter's observation that the Constitution
"has many commands that are not enforceable by courts because they
clearly fall outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial
action." 1 The best proof that the situation is not "clear" is that most
decisions on "political questions" are reached by a split court. The
conclusion of Justice Frankfurter that the Constitution "has left the
performance of many duties in our government scheme to depend on
the fidelity of the executive and legislative action" ' seems applicable
only to cases where the Court can corroborate its denial to take
jurisdiction on some constitutional mandate.
Two situations may arise. In one of them there is no dispute as
to whether a provision of the law was infringed, and the matter is
strictly connected with the functioning of one of the political branches
59. Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, particularly at 20
(1831).
60. Coleman v. Miller, supra note 23, at 454. Justice W. 0. DOUGLAS, in WE
THE JUDGES 56 (1956), admits that political questions are "not susceptible of precise
definition."
61. Colegrove v. Green, supra note 5, at 556.
62. Id. at 556.
TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY
of the government. In the second, there is a claim that a positive
mandate of the law or Constitution was violated.
Problems involving ratification of constitutional amendments be-
long to the first group. On this matter, in Coleman v. Miller,' the
Supreme Court said that
. . . the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legisla-
tures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal,
should be regarded as a political question pertainting to the
political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress
in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption
of the amendment.
Similarly, some measures taken by the political branches of the
government in liquidating the Civil War were held by the Court to
present only political issues. In State of Georgia v. Stanton,4 defend-
ants were sought to be restrained from carrying into effect the
"Reconstruction Acts," providing for an establishment of military
governments in the Southern States. It was contended that the exe-
cution of the acts would destroy the corporate existence of the States
by depriving them of all the means and instrumentalities whereby their
existence might be maintained. The Court dismissed the bill for want
of jurisdiction, stating that it called "for the judgment of the court
upon political questions, and, upon rights, not of persons or property,
but of a political character," as the rights under consideration were
those "of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of
corporate existence as a State." 5
Likewise, it was held in The Protector,6 that as to the exact date
of the beginning and end of the rebellion of the Southern States, it was
"(necessary . . . to refer to some public act of the political depart-
ments of the government .
The Constitution is not a statute, it is superior to it; it is the
supreme law of the country. Therefore, it seems proper to submit
questions involving changes in this law to the legislative branch of the
government. It is still easier to agree with the Supreme Court that
it is not up to the courts to question the fact that a statute, enacted by
Congress, had a wording appearing in text signed by the Speaker of
the House, the President of the Senate, and the President of the
United States.6" It cannot be shown, from the journals of either House,
63. Coleman v. Miller, supra note 23, at 450.
64. State of Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50 (1867).
65. Id. at 77.
66. The Protector, 79 U.S. 700 (1871).
67. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1849).
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that the act did not pass in the precise form in which it was authen-
ticated.
In the second group of cases, the Supreme Court refuses to take
jurisdiction in spite of the fact that plaintiff claims that constitutional
provisions were violated.
The largest group of such cases are those involving unrest in the
States and the attitude of the federal government towards this situation,
either passive or active.
Thus, in the leading case of Luther v. Borden,6" the Supreme Court
held, in essence, that the constitutional guaranty granted by the United
States to every State in the Union that they will have a republican form
of government " cannot be enforced in judicial proceedings. The
controversy arose in connection with the Dorr rebellion in Rhode Is-
land, in consequence of which the State had, for some time, two con-
stitutions and two hostile governments. Upon request of the govern-
ment called under the old constitution, President Tyler backed it, and
the rebellion was put at an end. Dorr was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court denied a writ of habeas
corpus to Dorr for want of jurisdiction,7" and in Luther v. Borden it
refused to consider which of the two constitutions of the State was the
basic law of Rhode Island, such inquiry belonging "to the political
power and not to the judicial." "'
In order to suppress the rebellion, the President called out the
militia; therefore, the situation was in some respects similar to the
one under consideration in Martin v. Mott; 72 and the Court relied, in
part, on that case. But the rules that were laid down in Luther v.
Borden were further going. Practically, there could be many com-
plications,7" and the situation could be never remedied if a few years
68. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
69. Art. IV, Sec. 4.
70. Ex Parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
71. Luther v. Borden, supra note 68, at 39.
72. Martin v. Mott, supra note 13.
73. In refusing to enjoin the President from setting up military governments in
the South, after the Civil War, on the ground that the enabling congressional acts
were unconstitutional, the Court said: "Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed
for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the
Court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President
complies with the order of the Court and refuses to execute the acts of Congress, is
it not clear that a collision may occur between the executive and legislative depart-
ments of the government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the
President for such refusal? And in that case could this Court interfere, on behalf
of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by
injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment?
Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public world of an attempt by this Court
to arrest proceedings in that Court?"; Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 475,
500-501 (1866).
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after the collapse of the rebellion, the Court declared that the federal
government supported the state government which was not a republican
one. However, theoretically, there seems to be no compelling reason
for the Court to abstain from expressing its opinion.
The reasoning of Luther v. Borden was applied in a few later
cases. In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,74 the
Court was asked to consider the question of whether the enactment of a
state law by popular initiative and referendum, permitted by the Oregon
Constitution, destroyed the republican form of the State's government.
The Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this contention on the merits,
and the United States Supreme Court declined to review its decision for
want of jurisdiction.'m
In some situations, the Court considers that duties imposed by
the Constitution cannot be judicially enforced as they are only of a
"moral" character. Art. IV, Sec. 2(2) and (3) of the Constitution
make it mandatory to the States to deliver escapees from justice or from
service and labor, to the State from which they fled. The constitutional
mandate was supplemented by a Congressional act in 1793. In The
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, Governor of the State of
Ohio,7 Kentucky brought a suit against Dennison to compel him to
deliver a certain Lago, free man of color, accused of the crime of
assisting a slave to escape. The Court held that the defendant had no
discretionary power as to the performance of his duty to deliver Lago,
but it found that the Congressional words "it shall be the duty" were
"declaratory of the moral duty," and "not used as mandatory and
compulsory." "7 The Court added that neither the Constitution nor the
statute did "provide any means to compel the execution of this duty," 78
and that "(t)he performance of this duty . . . is left to depend on
the fidelity of the State Executive to the compact entered into with the
other States when it adopted the Constitution of the United States
,, 79 Therefore, "there is no power delegated to the General
Government, either through the Judicial Department or any other
department, to use any coercive means to compel him." "
74. Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
75. See also Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S.
74, 79-80 (1930).
76. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
77. Id. at 107.
78. Id. at 107.
79. Id. at 109.
80. Id. at 109-110.
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With complete sympathy to the cause of Lago, it must be observed
that the soundness of the result reached by the Court is subject to
serious doubt. Clearly, neither the Constitution nor Congressional acts
are moral codes but legal documents. The Court could be unwilling to
enforce some legal duties, for good or bad reasons, but it is puzzling to
hear that in imposing a clear obligation upon the States, the Framers,
and then Congress did not mean what they said, and instead of laying
down rules of law, indicated only what the requirements of morals are.
In recent years, the Supreme Court seems to have increased the
scope of concept of "political questions." It may be doubted whether
this is a desirable development. Wisdom of a broad application of the
idea to disputes in which a constitutional provision is claimed to be
violated seems doubtful. After all, in the United States the Supreme
Court is the guardian of the Constitution and has the most important
duty to see to it that it be not violated. Certainly, the Constitution
contains many provisions which are political; it regulates the political
life of the country in its most outstanding features. But, at the same
time, it sets the bases of the legal order of the Union. Every provision
of the Constitution is a part of the supreme law of the United
States, and therefore has necessarily a legal character. If the Supreme
Court has authority to decide, in hundreds of cases it adjudicates,
whether the vague clauses of due process or commerce are complied
with, there is no obvious reason for which the claims that a much
more definite constitutional mandate, such as that the State are to have
a republican form of government, was violated, should escape jurisdic-
tion of the Court."' In a "government of law" as many questions should
be considered as legal and justiciable and submitted to the control of
the courts as possible.'
On the other hand, it was rightfully observed that the desire to
save the executive from embarrassment "may result in real embarrass-
ment by forcing an unwilling executive to commit itself, where a de-
cision by an independent judiciary could be explained away." ' Un-
doubtedly, such situations frequently arise, particularly in the field of
external relations, which lends itself more than any other to the deter-
81. In state courts, this provision is usually treated as enforceable by judicial
process; W. F. Dodd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 86. For comments on the view that
constitutions are "essentially political in nature," see C. G. HAINES, THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, at 12-16
(1944).
82. W. J. Wagner, The Colonial Airlines Case: Treaties and Executive Agree-
ments Relating to Aviation, WASH. U.L.Q. 211, 233 (1952).
83. Note, Judicial Deference to the State Department on International Legal
Issues, 97 U. PA. L REv. 79, 91 (1948) (emphasis in original).
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mination of the political branches of government. Therefore, "any
further shift of control" " from the courts away should be stopped."
In some cases, the characterization of certain questions as purely
"political" by the Court is startling. Thus, in Massachusetts v. Mel-
lon," a federal statute providing for appropriation of federal money for
maternity and infant care was challenged as unconstitutional because it
infringed upon the reserved state powers. It seems that the question
raised also constitutional legal questions, and could be passed upon by
the Court if all other requirements for its judicial determination were
met. However, the Court characterized "the naked contention that
Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several States by the
mere enactment of the statute" as raising a question which was "politi-
cal, and not judicial," and therefore was "not a matter which [admitted]
of the exercise of the judicial power." "'
It seems that in some cases in which the Court declines to take
jurisdiction over "political" questions, the most persuasive reason for
this attitude can be first its reluctance to get into a conflict with the
other branches of government, and the possibility that its decisions
would be disregarded. However, some conflicts may happen, and did
actually happen, in many other instances when the Court exercised
the power of judicial review. Thus, the situation would not be unusual.
A second practical consideration is the fact that in many cases, pro-
nouncement of the Court condemning an action taken by one of the
political branches of government a considerable period of time later,
would bring about a very complicated situation, hardly possible to be
taken under control.88  In state practice, it was attempted to rationalize
84. Id. at 92.
85. See also J. P. FRANK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, IN E. CAHN, SUPREME COURT
AND SUPREME LAW 36, 40 (1954) : ". . . [T]he doctrine of political questions ought
to be very sharply confined to cases where the functional reasons justify it, and . . .
in a given case involving its expansion, there should be careful consideration also of
the social considerations which may militate against it."
86. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
87. Id. at 483.
88. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, supra note 68, at 38. It was asserted that "[n]o
matter in what terms the opinions of jurists have been couched, it is apparent that
it is the fear of consequences or the lack of adequate data that has impelled the courts
to refrain from entering upon the discussion of the merits of prickly issues," and
suggested that the Supreme Court should extend the scope of the idea of political
questions, so as to cover by this term e.g. social and industrial legislation cases; M.
Finkelstein, op. cit. supra note 2, at 363 and 345, and Further Notes on Judicial
Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L. REV. 221 (1925). But to others, finding of political
questions in controversies submitted to the Court is just a construction of the Con-
stitution, similar to what is done in many other cases. "In some instances there is
enough uncertainty or generality so that not only past but present and to some extent
prophetic theories and notions must enter into the interpretative process. We are
dealing with cases of this . . . class, where the court's jurisdiction or lack of juris-
diction of the whole case or of some subordinate issue therein is governed by provisions
of not absolutely patent certainty;" M. F. Weston, op. cit. note 2, at 331. For a
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the declining of taking jurisdiction of some cases involving alleged
unconstitutional action by the courts, by classifying the constitutional
provisions into mandatory and directory ones. The first ones are
supposedly bound to be observed, and can be judicially enforced, while
the others are to be treated as recommendations rather than strict legal
rules. 9  In effect, this theory would permit approaching some con-
stitutional provisions in a way whole constitutions are usually ap-
proached in Latin American countries. The distinction between the
two types of provisions is very difficult and dangerous,' and similar
provisions of state constitutions received in the courts a different
characterization. To remedy the situation, the California Constitution
was amended in 1879 by inserting the following clause:
The provisions of this constitution are mandatory and pro-
hibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be other-
wise.91
A few other States followed the lead.
While, under this classification, "political" questions may be fitted
into the category of directory constitutional provisions, the whole con-
cept is broader, and covers mostly procedural rules in enactment of
statutes. The federal Constitution is silent on the subject.
Switzerland
The former Swiss system, prior to the Constitution of 1874, was
very peculiar. The federal judiciary was practically non-existent, and
the federal executive and legislative was invested with the duty to pass
on the controversies based on alleged improper acts of federal or
cantonal authorities. Even after the establishment of the Federal
Tribunal, for a long time its jurisdiction in "public law" cases was very
much restricted. "Public law" matters include, in the Swiss system,
constitutional and administrative law disputes between the federal au-
thorities and the individuals, and administrative law disputes between
the cantons and the individuals. It can be said that under this system,
the area of "political" disputes was abnormally broad. Its rationale
seemed to be that most of such controversies arise because of a gap in
view that "a lack of legal principles to apply to the questions presented" is the most
important consideration forcing the courts to decline to take jurisdiction of "political"
questions, see 0. P. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts,
8 MINN. L. R~v. 485, 512 (1924).
89. W. F. Dodd, op. cit. note 1.
90. T. M. COOLEY, A TRF-ATISE ON CONSTITUTIOXAL LrMrrATIONS 159-160 (8th
ed., 1927).
91. W. F. Dodd, supra, at 79.
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the law which can better be fitted by a legislator than by a judge. 2
But even where there was no gap and a constitutional right of a citizen
was violated, the body competent to take jurisdiction over the matter
was, by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of 1848, either the
federal executive or the legislature, and the Tribunal only exceptionally,
when the legislature remanded the cause to the federal judiciary. Under
this system, only one instance of such a case reaching the Tribunal ever
happened. The practice of conferring judicial functions on the legisla-
ture proved to be very unsatisfactory, particularly in view of the fact
that political reasons were often the determining factor underlying the
decisions.'
In the present Swiss Constitution, the federal executive is still
vested with jurisdiction over many "public law" disputes. Art. 102(2)
of the Constitution, speaking about the Federal Council, reads as fol-
lows:
It insures the observance of the Constitution, the laws and
ordinances of the Confederation and the provisions of federal con-
cordats. It takes the necessary measures to this end, of its own
accord or upon complaint, in such cases as are not included among
those which have to be submitted to the Federal Tribunal in
accordance with Art. 113.
Two other constitutional provisions vest judicial functions in the
legislature. Art. 85, enumerating matters "within the authority of the
two councils" (i.e., the Federal Assembly, composed of the National
Council and the Council of States), places within the jurisdiction of
the legislature:
(12) Appeals against decisions of the Federal Council relating to
administrative disputes (Article 113) ;
(13) Conflicts of jurisdiction between federal authorities.
From Subsection 12 it appears that the legislative branch of gov-
ernment has appellate jurisdiction in administrative cases which the
executive branch decides in the first instance. For a long time, the
jurisdiction of the Federal Tribunal in administrative law disputes
was extremely limited, and the exclusion from its competence of
"(a)dministrative disputes to be determined by federal legislation,"
as provided in Art. 113 of the Constitution, was given a broad scope.
Art. 59 of the Judiciary Act of 1874 withdrew from the jurisdiction of
92. M. Schoch, Conflict of Laws in a Federal State: The Experience of Switzer-
land, 55 HARv. L. REv. 738, 748 (1942).
93. A. SouRAC, L' voLr MoN DE LA JURICION FkDRALE EN SuIssE 235 (1909).
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the Tribunal matters which were regarded by the legislature as purely
administrative and political. The idea prevailing in Switzerland for
a long time was that every administrative law dispute has a political
flavor and should be decided by a political branch of the government.
Similarly, complaints alleging violation of the Constitution by adminis-
trative acts of the federal authorities went not to the Tribunal, but to
the Federal Council. This was a confusion of powers rather than
separation of powers. 4 The Tribunal's protection against violation of
constitutional rights, provided for in Art. 113(3) of the Constitution,
was granted only in cases where cantonal, not federal, authorities were
involved.' A situation similar to that in the field of constitutional law
existed in the field of administrative law. Gradually, by legislative
enactments, the scope of "political" questions to be decided by a political
branch of the government narrowed. However, except as to instances
expressly reserved to the jurisdiction of the Federal Tribunal, the
executive branch of the government still has jurisdiction over "public
law" disputes, in the first instance. Sec. 124 of the Judiciary Act of
1943 " provides:
Appeals to the Federal Council lie from decisions:
a. Of departments of the Federal Council, if they are not final
by virtue of a special provision of law;
b. Of the general board of federal railways, when an appeal
to the Federal Council is expressly provided for;
c. Of independent federal agencies of the federal administra-
tion which are not organs of the last instance.
The Federal Council is also competent to review decisions and
acts of the cantonal authorities in cases of violation of some enumerated
provisions of the federal Constitution, such as: Art. 18, clause 3
(equipment and arms of Swiss soldiers); Art. 27, clauses 2 and 3
(elementary public education in the cantons to be compulsory, free,
and under the control of lay authorities); Art. 51 (prohibition of
activity by the Jesuit order) ; and Art. 53, clause 2 (control of burial
places which is to be vested in lay authorities)."" Most of these
"political" questions relate to matters which the Constitution tries to
prevent from being connected with religious activities- a sign that in
the Swiss mind, religious problems may still be considered as political
ones.
94. Id. at 337.
95. It must be remembered that judicial review obtains, in Switzerland, only with
respect to acts of cantonal authorities.
96. 95 Bundesblatt I, 167 (1943) ; 60 Recueil des Lois Fidirales 269 (1944).
97. See. 125(1) (a) of the Judiciary Act of Switzerland.
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The Federal Council has also jurisdiction over certain cases in-
volving violations of some provisions of international treaties dealing
with commercial relations, customs matters, patents, etc." Litigation
may reach the Federal Council only after the remedies before the
cantonal authorities have been exhausted,99 if by the law they are not
made final, submitted to the jurisdiction of the Federal Tribunal, or
placed within the jurisdiction of the military authorities. 100
By virtue of Sec. 132(1) of the Judiciary Act, appeals from the
decisions of the Federal Council in cases provided for by Sec. 125(1)
(a) and (c), as well as in cases provided for by other federal statutes,
go to the Federal Assembly, the legislative branch of the government.
The Judiciary Act has still another clause providing for submission of
cases to the authority of the Federal Council, without placing them
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly: those in-
stituted against the cantonal authorities for violation of federal statutes
"which are not private or criminal law statutes," unless those statutes
or the Judiciary Act decide otherwise.'' Adjudication of conflicts of
jurisdiction between cantonal authorities are expressly reserved to the
Federal Tribunal.02
Thus, in cases of public and administrative law, the Federal Tri-
bunal is not the only judicial organ of the Swiss Confederation. The
opposition to any further increase of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
stems from some members of the other branches of government who
are reluctant to relinquish powers which traditionally belonged to
them.'0o
The two separate "public law" remedies in the Swiss system: the
appeal in constitutional law 104 and in administrative law,' by which
a case could reach a political body of the Confederation, were amal-
gamated into one even before the Judiciary Act of 1943 was enacted,1',
and this change was retained by the Act.
As pointed out above, Subsection (13) of Art. 85 of the Con-
stitution makes the legislature competent to adjudicate disputes between
the two other branches of federal government (and, possibly, between
98. Id. Sec. 125(1) (c).
99. Id. Sec. 125(1).
100. Id. Sec. 126.
101. Id. Sec. 125(1)(b).
102. Id. See. 125(2).
103. F. FLEiNER-Z. GIACOMETTI, SCHWEIZERISCHEs BUNDESSTAATREWHT 907 (1949).
104. Staatsrechtliche Beschwerde.
105. Verwaltungsbeschwerde.
106. F. FLEINER-Z. GIACOMErI, op. cit. note 103, at 922.
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two federal courts). Such disputes, by virtue of Art. 92 of the Con-
stitution, are decided in joint session of both chambers, under the chair-
manship of the President of the National Council. However, not many
conflicts reach the legislature."0 7 Many of them are settled by the
procedure of exchanging notes by the authorities involved, as provided
in the Judiciary Act.0 8
In the old Constitution of 1848, suits between the cantons, and
between them and the Confederation, could be withdrawn from the
competence of the Federal Tribunal and submitted to the legislature.
Such disputes could also be termed as "political."
Argentina
In Argentina, the case of Luther v. Borden ' was cited by the
Supreme Court, and the judiciary of that country went very far in
refusing to interfere with the action of the executive branch of the
government, calling it political whenever they could, and especially
when the central government took advantage, rightfully or wrongfully,
of the constitutional permission to intervene in the affairs of the
provinces "in order to guarantee the republican form of govern-
ment." 110 This reluctance is understandable in Argentina as well as
in other Latin American countries in view of the practical hegemony
of the executive branch of the government over the two others.
Besides, it must be emphasized that an important category of
disputes: those between the provinces, with respect to their boundaries,
escape judicial cognizance and are decided by the federal legislature,
a political body.'' Thus, it could be said that this kind of litigation
has the features of a political question, in Argentina. As held in
Carcano v. Santiago del Estero,"2 all that the Supreme Court of the
nation can do is to determine cases involving a boundary dispute where
the boundary has been fixed by Congress.
Mexico
The tendency not to take jurisdiction of cases which are likely to
result in a row between the judiciary and the federal executive and in
107. C. HUGHES, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND 97 (1954).
108. Sec. 96(2) of the Judiciary Act.
109. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
110. Art. 6 of the Constitution of 1853 of Argentina; Art. 7 of the Constitution
of 1949 of Argentina. For citation of cases, see S. P. AADEo, ARGENTINE CONSTITu-
TIONAL LAW 85 (1943).
111. Art. 67(14) of the Constitution of 1853 of Argentina (Art. 68(14) of the
Constitution of 1949 of Argentina) vested in Congress the power "to fix" the boundaries
of the provinces.
112. 98 S.C.N. 107 (1903), cited by S. P. AMADRo, op. cit. note 107, note 35 at 67.
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disregarding by the latter of the decisions of the former is most strong
in Mexico. Here, the jurists recognize that there are three main
branches of law: criminal, private, and political. While the courts
have to apply the first two, "to the executive belongs the application of
the political laws." "' And usually, when the federal executive under-
takes to construe and enforce the state constitutions in the manner it
likes, the courts declare that the controversy is of a political nature and
refuse to take cognizance of it."
4
Brazil
Similarly, in Brazil the courts usually abstain from taking the risk
of assuming jurisdiction over a case which may be said to involve
political issues. That an act of intervention of the Union into state
affairs exceeds the limits of judicial cognizance was asserted in a few
Supreme Court decisions in 1914 and 1915; however, exceptionally, it
occurred that the Court took jurisdiction of controversies the legal
character of which was tainted with politics; thus, in 1923, the Court
issued a writ to a president-elect of a state, with the view to enable him
to accede to his office, although the elections were alleged to be irregular
and the federal executive was about to take the matter into its hands."'
113. J. Almariz, Law and Justice [in Mexico], 208 ANNALS 39 (1940).
114. J. L. Mecham, Mexican Federalism-Fact or Fiction? 208 ANNALS 23, 29
(1940).
115. H. G. JAMES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF BRAzIL 109-110 (1923);
for other examples, see p. 208.
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